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Cutting the message into smaller portions is a common practice in the media. Typically
such messages consist of a headline followed by a story elaboration. In a series of
studies Dolinski and Kofta (2001) have shown that such a break in the message
increases the effect of the information provided in the headline over that of a story which
actually contained information inconsistent with that headline. A possible explanation
of this effect, based on the concept of the need for cognitive closure, is presented in
the article. The experiment shows that break-in-the-message effect is found mainly for
participants with high need for closure but not for those with low such need.
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INTRODUCTION
Cutting the message into smaller portions is a common practice in modern media all over the
world. Typically, such reports consist of a headline (i.e., an announcement or a preview of the
story) followed by the story elaboration (i.e., a detailed account of the event). The headline explains
what happened. The event is briefly presented in a decontextualized manner, its most sensational
aspects exposed. The story elaboration describes how this event transpired. Contextual knowledge
is provided about the event’s circumstances, the actors’ social and psychological characteristics,
and the story dynamics. Additionally, some experts in the field may present their opinions about
the event. Importantly, the various parts of the story are usually separated in time. This happens
most frequently on television and radio, where following presentations of the headline, the full
story is presented with some delay. Temporal delays may also naturally occur when people read
newspapers starting with a brief description of an event on the cover page and then later read the
entire story inside the issue. On the Internet, the headline is often visible on the screen, but in
order to obtain more detailed information one must scroll over it and click using a mouse. For
example, under the headline “Serious danger in the supermarket” one may read on the cover page
of a newspaper “Poisoned food has been found in one of the country’s most popular supermarkets.
The situation seems to be very serious since more than 300 people visit this shop on a daily basis.”
Subsequently (after the break) the reader finds the entire story inside the paper, which informs that
a party of fresh milk (20 bottles) sold in this store yesterday contained a slightly higher amount of
bacteria than is allowed according to sanitary regulations. The medical expert interviewed for the
story says that these bacteria may lead to minor diarrhea in people who drink a lot of milk, but it
is not particularly harmful to health. Store executives have initiated evaluation procedures, but it is
still unclear why the milk supplier did carefully check product quality before shipping to the store.
A detailed inspection is taking place in the dairy.
Dolinski and Kofta (2001) have experimentally demonstrated how splitting a news story
affects recipients’ attributions of responsibility to the people presented in the story. The main
manipulation in their research consisted of presenting a story as either an integrated, continuous
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message, or separating the headline from the elaboration by a
break in time. The authors found that a break in the message
increased perceived responsibility and moral disapproval of the
person or persons implicated by the initial information presented
about the story. Segmentation of a news story was also associated
with more punitive judgments about these individuals (which
was consistent with the initial headline but inconsistent with the
subsequently elaborated message).
For example, in one of the experiments the participants were
university students living in a dormitory who happened to listen
that day to the university radio station. Approximately half of
the dormitory rooms were set up so that the radio message was
delivered in a continuous manner, while the other half of the
rooms were presented with a message that was interrupted by a
message that was itself interrupted by a piece of music, which is
typical for most radio transmissions. (This procedure was made
possible thanks to cooperation with the radio staff). Dormitory
tenants were informed that a female student named Magda R.
had reported to the police and testified that during a party she
was raped by Marek W., who was on a short leave from military
service. The participants in the continuous story condition then
heard Marek W. describing this fateful night quite differently.
In contrast, listeners in the break-in-the-message condition were
informed that the story would be continued following a piece of
rock music. Either immediately or after a delay the participants
heard from Marek W, who explained that he had engaged in sex
with Magda R., but that it was consensual. He also admitted that
she used to be his girlfriend, and that they had a serious argument
during the party. He stated his opinion that Magda R. accused
him out of revenge. After the broadcast, experimenters knocked
on students’ doors and asked them for their opinions about the
incidents. Analysis of the results revealed that participants who
had heard the story with the musical interruption were more
certain that the accused had indeed raped the girl, attributed
more responsibility to him, and made more punitive judgments
than participants who heard the story without the interruption.
Although the effects of the structure of information have
long been studied in psychology (e.g., Asch, 1946; Anderson,
1965), a more recent look at this phenomenon took into account
the role of chunking of information. Petty et al. (2001) asked
participants to read arguments for and against a proposed
new exam policy. The arguments were presented in either a
standard or chunked condition. The experiment showed that a
stronger need for cognition amplifies the primacy effect when
information is chunked. When the information was not chunked,
this pattern was reversed: there were primacy effects for low need
for cognition participants and recency effects for those with high
need for cognition. Petty et al. (2001) explained their results
by suggesting that high need for cognition individuals who are
motivated to think process the initial chunk of information in
greater depth, and therefore create an abstract of this information
in the form of an attitude or schema. This cognitive structure may
bias participants when encountering inconsistent information.
Dolinski and Kofta (2001) did not take into account individual
differences, but they consistently obtained a primacy effect in
their “break in the message” experiments. However, there is a
substantial difference between these authors’ methodology and
that employed by Petty et al. (2001) in that chunking does not
imply breaking the message into two separate pieces with a time
separation. It is the time gap which facilitates crystallization
of the cognitive structure, which in turn leads to bias in the
processing of the second segment, perhaps through confirmation
bias. By confirmation bias we refer to the tendency to seek
and interpret evidence in a manner congruent with existing
beliefs, expectations or hypotheses (e.g., Koriat et al., 1980; Frey,
1981; Holton and Pyszczynski, 1989). In the headline phase
the individual is informed that a dramatic event has happened.
In the absence of contradicting information, at this stage the
participant classifies the offender as a rapist. The information
arriving at a later stage and suggesting the possibility that
no rape occurred is ignored because of its incongruency with
the cognitive structure which has already labeled the man a
rapist. This explanation, however, implies heuristic thinking
rather than the more careful thinking suggested by Petty et al.
(2001). Both the categorization stage during the exposure to the
headline phase (Thompson et al., 1994; Ford and Kruglanski,
1995), as well as confirmation bias (Jonas et al., 2001; Bar-Tal,
2010) more strongly indicate heuristic thinking than the vigilant
thinking implied by the conceptualization suggested by Petty
et al. (2001). Following this logic, in the present paper we examine
the moderating effect of epistemic motivation to use heuristic
thinking on the “breaking the news” phenomenon through the
lens of the Need for Closure (NFC) concept described in Lay
epistemology theory by Kruglanski (1989, 1990; Kruglanski and
Webster, 1996). Lay epistemology theory suggests the presence
of two stages in the knowledge acquisition process. In the first
stage, the cognitive content (in lay epistemology terms, the
hypothesis) is created. This stage is labeled as “seizing.” In
the second stage this content is evaluated by reviewing it and
comparing to other content the person is aware of. If it is not
found to be inconsistent with other content, and there is no
alternative explanation, the individual becomes certain that the
content is valid. The length of the validation process depends
on the epistemic mechanisms of “freezing” and “unfreezing.”
Faster freezing implies less thorough examination, and therefore
achieving certainty more quickly as to the validity of the
hypothesized cognition. Unfreezing of the epistemic process
implies a longer process of examination, examination of the
consistency of a greater amount of content and of more possible
alternative explanations. As long as the unfreezing stage is in
progress, the individual cannot be certain about the validity of the
cognitive content. The epistemic freezing–unfreezing mechanism
is governed by epistemic motivation. The greatest attention in
the theory is paid to the NFC. NFC refers to an individual’s
desire for a definitive answer to a question and an aversion
toward ambiguity. People with heightened NFC experience the
absence of such an answer as aversive. According to Kruglanski,
NFC is influenced by states (e.g., time pressure, conditions that
render processing of information difficult, aversive, or laborious),
while it also constitutes a more stable, trait-like characteristic.
Cognitive processes used by high-NFC individuals to reduce
uncertainty include avoiding inconsistent information and the
use of category-based, non-systematic, and heuristic thinking.
In other words, high-NFC individuals are characterized by
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more extensive and faster use of epistemic freezing. In contrast,
individuals with low levels of NFC prefer to reduce uncertainty
by using piecemeal or individuation processes (unfreezing)1. This
preference is manifested in vigilant behavior that is based on
a systematic and effortful search for relevant information, its
evaluation, and its unbiased assimilation (Driscoll et al., 1991;
Bar-Tal et al., 1997; Kruglanski et al., 2009). In terms of lay
epistemology theory, the ‘breaking the message’ phenomenon is
explained in the following way: when a headline is presented
without an immediate following elaboration, it creates a schema
or a hypothesis. Fast freezing of this content causes the individual
to believe that it is accurate. Therefore, an encounter at a
later stage with inconsistent information causes uncertainty and
aversion. The avoidance of information inconsistent with the
schema is characteristic of confirmation bias. When there is no
break in the message, the headline is processed together with the
rest of the information. The “seizing” stage will probably require
more time, but it will result in content which is a combination
of the headline and the subsequent information. Thus, it can
be hypothesized that high-NFC individuals who tend to freeze
faster and avoid schema-inconsistent information, in order to
avoid the aversion caused by uncertainty, will be more affected by
the ‘breaking the news’ phenomenon than low-NFC individuals.




A group of 103 male university students aged 19 to 43 (M= 29.08;
SD = 6.58) participated in the experiment in exchange for
compensation of two tokens for lunch in the university cafeteria.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the conditions:
control and experimental (break-in-the-message). Since only a
few female students were available to us, we decided to have only
male participants in the study.
Procedure
Participants (in groups of 6 to 16 individuals) initially completed
a scale designed to measure their NFC. We used the Polish
version (Kossowska, 2003) of the NFC scale (Webster and
Kruglanski, 1994). Respondents rated 32 items on a six-point
scale (from 1 = completely disagree to 6 = completely agree).
The reliability of the scale in the present study was Cronbach
α= 0.75. The mean score for all items was calculated as M= 3.74;
SD= 0.54. A higher mean score indicated a higher level of NFC.
Subsequently, they were asked to listen to part of a radio
program “presenting a story about a young female student.”
1It should be noted that while NFC is very widely used in social psychology,
there is a variety of concepts with different theoretical backgrounds but similar
predictions applied in psychological research. For example: need for structure,
tolerance for ambiguity, open and closed mind, personal need for structure, etc
(Frenkel Brunswik, 1949; Rokeach, 1960; Bunder, 1962; Kagan, 1972; Epstein, 1991;
Neuberg and Newsom, 1993). Although the various theoretical elaborations differ
from one another, there is broad agreement among them regarding the cognitive
processes used by high-NFC and low-NFC individuals to reduce uncertainty.
The story (based on one used by Dolinski and Kofta, 2001,
study 1) started with the information that a 20-year-old student
visited a local hospital, complaining of acute abdominal pain
which had worsened over the preceding few days. The doctor on
duty examined her briefly, diagnosed an ovarian inflammation,
and admitted her to the hospital for further observation. In
the early hours of the morning, however, the patient died. The
autopsy showed a ruptured appendix. In the control condition,
this part of the story was subsequently followed by more detailed
information. In the break-in-the-message condition, however, at
this moment a piece of music lasting about 2 min was played.
The rest of the story was delivered after this break. The second
part of the story (of course, exactly the same in both conditions)
provided several justifications for the doctor’s actions. In brief, the
participants were informed that his diagnosis was understandable
owing to the fact that, in a routine examination, inflammation
of the ovaries presents similar symptoms to that of appendicitis.
In addition, during the doctor’s interview the patient stressed
that she had been suffering from various gynecological diseases
for several years. Additionally, the doctor could not operate
immediately because the anaesthesiologist on duty in the hospital
was busy at that moment. In both conditions participants were
asked to answer three questions using a 7-point scale (ranging
from 0 to 6):
(1) To what extent is the doctor on duty responsible for the
patient’s death (from 0 “not at all responsible” to 6 “fully
responsible”)
(2) The prosecutor demands a sentence of 6 years in prison
for the doctor, while his lawyer demands an acquittal. The
judge can acquit him or order from 1 to 6 years in prison.
What would be a fair judgment? (from 0 “acquitted of
charges” to 6 “six years in prison”)
(3) What is your moral evaluation of this doctor? (from 0 “very
positive” to 6 “very negative”)
These items as described created a unidimensional measure of
moral disapproval. (Cronbach’s α= 0.91; M = 2.51; SD= 1.46).
All participants gave their written informed consent to take
part in the study and were fully debriefed after completion of the
experiment. The design and the experiment conditions for the
study were approved by the local University of Social Science and
Humanities Ethics Committee in accordance with the Helsinki
Declaration.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
To test the hypothesis we performed a hierarchical regression in
two steps. In the first step, we examined the two main effects
[manipulation of the time break as a dummy variable, and
NFC score; F(2,100) = 23.47, p < 0.01]. In the second step we
introduced the interaction effect [F(3,99) = 22.20, p< 0.01]. Total
explain variance was 0.40. Table 1 presents the results of our
analysis.
The table shows that all three effects are significant. As in
Dolinski and Kofta’s (2001) experiments we have shown that
separating the headline from the elaborated part by inserting a
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TABLE 1 | Regression analysis.
B SE β T 1R2 F Change Low CI for B High CI for B
Step 1 0.32 23.47∗∗
Manipulation 1.38 0.24 0.47 5.74∗ 0.90 1.86
Need for Closure (NFC) 0.41 0.12 0.28 3.40∗ 0.17 0.65
Step 2 0.08 13.70∗∗
Manipulation X NFC 0.90 0.24 0.50 3.70∗ 0.42 1.38
∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01.
time break increased the severity of negative moral judgments
about the accused person. This finding clearly suggests that it is
not only the content of the message that is important in social
influence, but also the manner in which the news is delivered.
As widespread practices in modern mass media, segmentation
and time separation in the delivery of messages may seriously
influence the opinions of the audience. In addition, our research
has shown a relation between the need for cognitive closure
and the level of moral disapproval. High NFC was connected
with more punitive assessments. This effect may be explained
by greater rigidity among high-NFC individuals. Kossowska
and Van Hiel (2003) demonstrated that NFC is associated with
intolerance of those who violate conventional norms (see also:
Kosic et al., 2004; Van Hiel et al., 2004). For interpretation of
the interaction we examined the simple slopes of the dependent
measure on the manipulation of breaking up the news for
individuals with high and low NFC levels (1 SD above and
below the mean) Using Hayes Process Model 1 (2013). The
results shows that while for low NFC individuals there a non-
significant effect of the manipulation of the time break (b= 0.50,
SE, = 0.33, t = 1.52, p = ns, LLCI = −0.15, ULCI = 1.15),
this effect is significant in the case of high-NFC individuals
(b = 1.39, SE = 0.22, t = 6.17, p < 0.01, LLCI = 0.95,
ULCI= 1.85).
From the practical point of view, one may therefore conclude
that the media practice of cutting the message into two portions
is especially (or perhaps exclusively) dangerous for high-NFC
recipients. If media producers would like to avoid leading such
people to premature, overconfident moral judgements, they
should limit the headline portion of the message to a brief
summary or, on the contrary, to present it in rather elaborated
form, instead of utilizing the intermediate-length presentation
prevalent today.
We are aware that this study should be treated only as a first
step in investigating the role played by NFC in the break-in-
the-message phenomenon. Although Dolinski and Kofta (2001)
have shown that this effect is quite robust, since it emerged
on different measures, in different samples, and in different
experimental conditions, the moderating role of NFC should be
investigated further. For example, it is particularly interesting
to see whether the pattern of results would be the same if
participants were initially informed about the power of the
break-in-the-message effect and/or were encouraged to rely on
the information presented in the second phase. Another set
of questions concerns the valence of the story presented to
participants. In both experiments by Dolinski and Kofta (2001)
and in this paper, threatening and negative acts were presented.
The question arises of whether the pattern of results would be the
same if a neutral or laudable act were presented in the headline.
Yet another problem is connected with the information delivered
in the second phase. While it has been demonstrated that the
break-in-the-message effect occurs when this information is
ambiguous and/or uncertain, it is an open question whether the
same would be observed if the second part clearly contradicted
the first one.
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